Negligence of the government and NIID has revealed related to the fear of a possible bioterrorist attack 

The government's measures against bioterrorisms have little actual effectiveness
 
As a result of the US and NATO attack against Afghanistan, we Japanese are also concerned that bioterrorists will target Japan.@This concern is fueled by an outbreak of anthrax infection in Florida and other states in the US. The Japanese government listed dangerous pathogens such as anthrax bacilli and smallpox viruses likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack, sent to research institutes dealing with these pathogens a notice to ask them to strengthen management of pathogens such as measures against theft, and surveyed these institutes by questionnaire to grasp their possession of dangerous pathogens and the real states of their management systems. It is also reported that the government considers amending the law on prohibition of biological weapons.  
However, it is doubtful whether these measures taken by the Japanese government have actual effectiveness. This is because no focus is placed on the fundamental matter. This is the fact that Japan is in a lawless situation in the area of the management of pathogens and biofacilities (laboratories dealing with pathogens and recombinant DNA) because there are no laws containing provisions on registration of biofacilities, their regulation, inspection into them and penalties against violators. 
What the government has to do urgently is to put an end to such a lawless condition. 
Lessons from the Aum sect incidents are not learned 
It is fresh in our memories that the Aum sect, who made sarin gas attacks on Tokyo subway system, attempted a bioterror attack on the Kameido district in the Sumida Ward of Tokyo by scattering anthrax and botulism bacilli. In Japan, which the lawless situation governs, the Aum sect could freely to build a bio facility and prepare secretly for culturing bacteria. In the ongoing case, the sect has not yet been brought to justice for setting up a bio facility and using pathogens. The routes through which the sect collected pathogens remain unclear. 
The crime of the Aum sect was discovered in 1995. For more than 10 years after that, no measures have been taken by the government as well as the National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIID) expected to take a leadership in promoting the safety dealing with pathogens and securing the safety of facilities. 
In its answers to our memorandum on questions, the government responded carefree, saying, "With respect to recombinant DNA technology or facilities which make experiments using pathogens, we have not yet prepared to grasp the whole situation concerning the location of facilities and their measures to secure safety. As for the nationwide investigation of these facilities, we want to study its possibility and necessity by the ministries and agencies involved." The fear of a possible bioterrorist attack is increased by the negligence of the government and NIID that have not tried to learn from the Aum sect incidents.



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