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POINT OF VIEW / Susumu Saito:Realignment of dollar will affect security ties ドルの再調整は日米安全保障に影響する。 |
The deteriorating U.S. external balance-of-payments position will likely have not only economic but also far-reaching strategic and national security implications for Japan and the rest of the western Pacific region. 悪化を続ける米国国際収支位置は、恐らく経済だけでなく、遠大な戦略と日本および西部太平洋地域の残りの国々のための戦略の含意と国家防衛の含意を持つだろう。 A realignment of the U.S. dollar against major currencies appears almost
inevitable, and it will quite likely bring about a sizable change in the
relative standing of the world's economic powers. The April 1996 joint declaration between then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
and then U.S. President Bill Clinton amounted to a de facto revision of
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, enlarging its implied geographical coverage.
The 1960 treaty in force now, literally interpreted, had restricted its
geographical coverage to the Far East. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force's logistical support for the U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean for Afghan
operations since 2001 has been rationalized only on the above-mentioned
joint declaration. The new Japanese defense chief has recently hinted at even the need for a formal revision of the 1960 treaty, as Japan and the United States appear to envisage a further extension of the treaty's geographic coverage to strengthen the Japan-U.S. ``bilateral alliance.'' Advocates for the strong bilateral alliance between Japan and the United
States have long argued that it would sufficiently restrict room for China's
maneuvering in alliance-building and hence bring about more stability in
the Pacific region. Japan's multilateral approaches 日本の多国間アプローチ My point is that the coming realignment of the dollar against major currencies,
if realized, will significantly restrict the economic and financial affordability
of U.S. overseas military adventures. Hence, Japan's own independently
footed multilateral approaches to security issues will be more realistic
than simple blind faith in the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance alone. To the dismay of Japan's own bilateralists, China has not been necessarily ``contained'' by the Japan-U.S. alliance, as it has tried to break the ``containment'' by strengthening ties with continental European nations, France in particular. French and other European nations' moves for selling advanced weapons to China are very destabilizing for East Asia. Japan, despite the bilateral alliance with the United States, has yet to block such European overtures for China. In listening to the three TV debates for the Nov. 2 presidential election
between Bush and Kerry for the past month, many non-American observers,
including myself, might wonder how the upcoming U.S. administration, Republican
or Democratic, would finance the ballooning U.S. military expenditure and
other domestic economic commitments when both the U.S. federal budget and
current account are deep in the red. For the past three years, the U.S. administration has pursued a policy
of guns and butter, which has been common since the end of World War II.
The Lyndon B. Johnson administration pursued the program for the Great
Society and the execution of the Vietnam War in the 1960s. The Ronald Reagan
administration pushed for a huge military buildup against the now-defunct
Soviet Union and large-scale tax cuts in the 1980s. Likewise, the current Bush administration has cut income taxes and increased
military spending by more than 40 percent from the first quarter of 2001
to $541.2 billion in the second quarter of 2004 at an annual rate. During
the same period, the U.S. federal budget position has seen a swing from
a surplus of $156.6 billion to a deficit of $382.9 billion, or a deterioration
of $539.5 billion in total, at an annual rate. The guns and butter policies in the 1960s and the 1980s had similar consequences: the sharp deterioration of the U.S. external balance and the precipitous fall in the dollar's exchange rates against major currencies. Technically, it was possible for the United States to choose the improvement
in the external balance of payments over other policy objectives, such
as full employment. A sufficiently tighter monetary and fiscal policy mix
would have suppressed domestic demand at the expense of employment to generate
the U.S. current account surpluses stabilizing the dollar's exchange rates
against major currencies. As a norm of any democratic regime, however, it is politically prohibiting
for the U.S. administration, Republican or Democratic, to sacrifice employment
conditions in favor of the improvement in the balance-of-payments position
for a prolonged period. Balance of military power
兵力のバランス An easy way out of the dilemma between employment and external deficits
has always been to let the dollar fall against the currencies of the major
trading partners with the United States. The deterioration of the U.S. balance-of-payments position has represented
the ``relative,'' if not absolute, decline in global U.S. economic might
for the past five decades or so. Sooner or later, the balance of military
might will follow suit as Britain has experienced in the past century. In reformulating Japan's own security arrangement, the scope in time should
be at least half a century, taking into account the rapidly changing balance
of economic and hence military powers. * * * The author is director of Trilateral Institute Inc. (Sankyoku Keizai Kenkyusho),
a private think tank based in Tokyo. His column runs on the third Wednesday
of each month.(IHT/Asahi: October 20,2004) (10/20) |