In the past few years, the Dalai Lama and a number of cognitive scientists and philosophers, including Patricia Churchland, have been meeting to discuss and compare Buddhist and modern approaches to the nature of mind. No doubt one of the most difficult problems they have taken up is the question of physicalism. Historically, the burden of defending mind against forms of physicalism has been delegated to the Buddhist epistemologists, the pramāṇavāda school, so that to this day we find few Buddhist arguments on these issues other than those (more or less loosely) based upon the second chapter of Dharmakīrtī’s Pramāṇavārttika. These arguments, while they still have considerable prestige in traditional circles, are no longer credible, especially when faced with eliminative physicalism. Curiously enough, core ideas of the Madhyamaka have been, I think, considerably undersold and underdeveloped in canonical Buddhist literature when it comes to providing a Buddhist defence of mind. I hope to show that a more promising philosophy of mind would have to go in Madhyamaka directions.